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Abstract
Most studies on polygamy mainly focus on the male normative interpretation 
of  the Quran. This paper, however, will focus on the practices of  polygamy. 
It will mainly explore whether the practices of  polygamy are legal or illegal 
(unregistered for not following the procedure and requirements stated in the 
1974 Marriage Law). This paper argues that most polygamous marriages in 
Indonesia are illegal. This practice can be considered a form of  resistance to 
the Law which requires a husband to ask the permission from the Religious 
Court before entering polygamous marriages. This paper will also elaborate 
various living arrangements of  legal and illegal polygamous marriages with 
various consequences on maintenance and property ownership among wives. 
[Kebanyakan studi tentang poligami berfokus pada interpretasi laki-laki 
terhadap al-Quran yang bersifat normatif. Akan tetapi, artikel ini akan 
berfokus pada praktik poligami. Artikel ini terutama akan menerangkan 
apakah praktik poligami itu legal atau tidak legal (tidak dicatatkan 
karena tidak mengikuti aturan yang ditetapkan dalam Undang-Undang 
Perkawinan/UUP 1974). Artikel ini berargumen bahwa kebanyakan 
perkawinan poligami itu dipraktikan secara illegal. Praktik ini merupakan 
bentuk dari penentangan terhadap UUP yang mengharuskan seorang suami 
memohon izin terlebih dahulu kepada Pengadilan Agama sebelum berpoligami. 
Makalah ini juga akan menjelaskan berbagai pengaturan hidup dalam 
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perkawinan poligami baik yang legal ataupun yang tidak legal dengan berbagai 
konsekuensinya terhadap nafkah dan kepemilikan harta di antara para istri.]
Keywords: legal and illegal polygamy, access to income, access to property
A. Introduction
The Indonesian government regulates the practice of  polygamy 
through the 1974 Marriage Law. This Law was the result of  a prolonged 
campaign that was initiated in the 1920s by many Indonesian women’s 
organizations. Along the way they faced many challenges, mainly 
resistance from the Islamist “religious” groups.1 For example, on the 
issue of  polygamy, secular women’s organizations such as Istri Sedar2 
and Putri Mardika,3 argued for the abolition of  polygamy, while Islamist 
“religious” groups and Muslim women’s organizations, such as Aisyiyah4 
and Muslimat,5 believed that Islam allows polygamy and therefore it 
should not be prohibited, despite its negative impact on many women 
and children. The belief  that Islam supports polygamy is based on the 
popular literal understanding of  the Quran 4:3,6 whilst contextualistand 
progressive Muslims, such as Egyptian reformist Muhammad Abduh 
(1849-1905), understand the verse to discourage and even prohibit 
polygamous marriage.7
1 “Religious” group here means those who have studied or taught in Islamic 
institutions such as pesantren (Islamic boarding school), otherwise known as madrasah.
2 Istri Sedar [aware women] was founded in Bandung in 1930, which aims for 
equal rights between men and women, especially in gaining education. Most of  its 
members are elite educated women.
3 Putri Mardika [liberated women] was founded in Jakarta in 1912, which aims 
to educate women, to train them how to speak in public and to improve their lifes.
4 Aisyiyah is the women’s wing organisation of  Muhammadiyah, the second 
largest moderate Muslim organisation. It was founded in 1917 in Yogyakarta, which 
aims to improve the society welfare by providing health and educational services.
5 Muslimat is the women’s wing organisation of  Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the 
largest moderate Muslim organisation in Indonesia. It was founded in 1946.
6 If  ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry 
women of  your choice, two or three or four; but if  ye fear that ye shall not be able 
to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, 
that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice (Yusuf  ‘Ali translation).
7  Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (ed.), Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Ḥakīm al-Shahīr bi-Tafsīr al-
Manār (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 1973), p. 350.
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The controversy prior to the enactment of  the 1974 Marriage seems 
to be reflected in the Indonesian’s people willingness or not to obey the 
1974 Marriage Law. My research shows that people from a “secular” 
background tend to obey the 1974 Marriage in relation to polygamy, 
marriage registration and the minimum age of  marriage. On the other 
hand, people from a “religious” background, who prefer to follow the 
opinions of  the classical Middle Eastern jurists (classical fiqh), tend to 
disobey the provisions of  the Marriage Law which do not appear in the 
classical fiqh, such as the requirement to seek court permission before 
practicing polygamy and marriage registration.8 This disobedience of  the 
Law affects negatively on women’s access to joint marital property and 
access to income (maintenance), especially if  they were married in an 
unregistered polygamous marriage. In a legal, registered marriage a wife 
is entitled to receive maintenance from her husband and joint marital 
property and she can sue the husband if  the husband does not provide 
these rights.9 In contrast, in an illegal, unregistered marriage, there is no 
legal protection for the wife whose rights for maintenance or joint marital 
property can be easily violated by her husband. However, despite the 
common assumption that women are the passive victim of  polygamy and 
only live off  the maintenance from their husband, my research findings 
show that some women are active agents and make significant economic 
contributions to their family. This paper will demonstrate how women 
strategically employ their economic interests, given the possibility of  
legal and illegal polygamy.
This paper is based on the fieldwork I undertook in three cities in 
West Java (Bandung, Bogor, and Depok) and Jakarta from December 2003 
through April 2004. I updated some data by undertaking further fieldwork 
in Bandung in 2012. I also visited the Bandung municipal Religious 
Court in 2004, 2012 and 2014 to discover the number of  polygamous 
cases registered in the court. In the first fieldwork, I conducted in-depth 
interviews with 74 informants, male and female, from a total of  39 
marriages. I also interviewed 11 children from polygamous families and 
8 Nina Nurmila, Women, Islam and Everyday Life: Renegotiating Polygamy in Indonesia 
(London: Routledge, 2011).
9 Marriage Law 1974, Articles 34 and 35.
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two committee members of  the Polygamy Award,10 one of  whom had 
two wives.
This research is a feminist research. It does not merely present the 
cases of  women who were involved in polygamous marriage. It raises 
women’s voices to the surface, to challenge injustice against women. This 
research also challenges the patriarchal nature of  the 1974 Marriage Law, 
which tends to focus on the interests of  adult males, while subordinating 
the interests of  women and children. For example, the 1974 Marriage Law 
provision on polygamy only considers male interests should the husband 
fall ill and/or have a barren wife, but it does not address the opposite 
situation where a healthy wife has a sick and/or infertile husband. Women 
also tend to be positioned as sexual beings and servants for the fulfilment 
of  their husband’s needs, not as equal partners, who need love and care 
if  they are sick.
B. Polygamy in Indonesia Prior to the 1974 Marriage Law
Prior to the enactment of  the 1974 Marriage Law, Indonesian 
women had no legal protection of  their rights within marriage. Many 
of  them had become victims of  under-age marriage, unilateral divorce 
and arbitrary polygamy. Indonesian Muslims mainly refer to the classical 
fiqh to decide what to do in relation to marriage, divorce and polygamy. 
In classical fiqh, registration is not required for a marriage to be valid 
and court intervention is not required for divorce and polygamy. This is 
understandable because in the eighth and the ninth centuries when this 
fiqh was written, people were less mobile and tended to know who had 
married whom, and registration was therefore not considered important. 
However, by the twentieth century many female activists were concerned 
at the vulnerable position in which women had been placed due to the 
reliance on this classical fiqh. Women’s organizations were concerned 
10 The Award was given by Puspo Wardoyo, a rich restaurateur who had four 
wives, to polygamous husbands who were considered “successful” in their polygamous 
marriage. The Polygamy Award committee, however, claimed that due to the short 
award application time, they allowed any polygamous husbands to attend the Award 
night regardless of  whether they met the criteria of  successful polygamous husbands. 
For further detail about the Award Night, see Nina Nurmila, “Polygamy and Chickens”, 
Inside Indonesia, No. 83, Jul-Sep (2005), http://www.insideindonesia.org/polygamy-and-
chickens, accessed 2 Mar 2016; Nurmila, Women, Islam and Everyday Life, pp. 64–77.  
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over the vulnerable position of  married women because there were many 
cases of  polygamy, child marriage and easy divorce.11 Vreede-de Stuers 
termed arbitrary divorce and polygamy the “two-headed monster” which 
caused insecurity of  women, family disintegration and the neglect of  the 
children.12 Dewi Sartika, one of  the advocates for women’s education in 
West Java, referred to polygamy as “a gangrene on society”.13 Therefore, 
the women’s organizations campaigned for five decades from the 1920s 
to have codified marriage law that could protect women’s position within 
marriage.
The Marriage Law was finally  passed by  the Parliament  on  22 
December 1973 and was signed by President Soeharto on 2 January 
1974. Not  all  parties were  fully  satisfied with  the Law,  especially  the 
secular women’s organizations who opposed polygamy. However, it was 
appreciated that the Law requires court permission before obtaining 
divorce and practicing polygamy, a measure aimed at reducing the 
incidence of  divorce and polygamy. In addition, the Law has provided 
protection for the property rights of  both husband and wife. Article 35 
(1) states that any property gained within the period of  marriage becomes 
joint property and Article 36 (1) states that the husband and wife can act 
or deal with the joint property based on the agreement of  each party. 
However, Articles 31 (3) and Article 34 construct the man as the head of  
the family who should financially provide for the family, whilst the woman 
is positioned as a housewife who takes care of  the family’s domestic 
affairs. This can make women’s economic contributions to the family 
invisible and create the stereotype that all men are family breadwinners. 
11 Saskia E. Wieringa, “The Politicization of  Gender Relations in Indonesia: 
The Indonesian Women’s Movement and Gerwani Until the New Order State”, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, (Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1995), p. 60.
12 Cora Vreede de Stuers, The Indonesian Woman: Struggles and Achievements (The 
Netherlands: Mouton, 1960), pp. 136–40.
13 Ibid., p. 175; Wieringa, “The Politicization of  Gender Relations in Indonesia”, 
p. 58.
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C. Polygamy in Indonesia after the 1974 Marriage Law
According to Azra14 and Katz and Katz,15 many scholars were 
pessimistic about the possible outcomes of  the enactment of  1974 
Marriage Law, but they saw that the Law, together with other factors, such 
as the rising standard of  education and the family planning campaign, 
had successfully reduced the incidence of  divorce and polygamy and 
helped enforce the minimum age of  marriage. Even though there were 
no actual figures on the decreased incidence of  polygamy, Azra assumes 
that the 1974 Marriage Law could reduce the incidence of  polygamy 
due to the difficult requirements for registering polygamous marriages.16 
To register a polygamous marriage, the Law requires the husband to 
apply for permission from the Religious Court. The court can permit 
the husband to practice polygamy if  (1) his wife cannot fulfil her duties 
as a wife; (2) his wife has physical defects and/or an incurable disease; 
and (3) his wife cannot bear children. The husband must also (1) have 
the consent of  his existing wife/wives; (2) be able to financially support 
all his existing wives and children; (3) ensure that he treats all his wives 
and children justly. Only court-permitted polygamous marriages can be 
registered and therefore considered legal, while polygamous marriages 
without court permission cannot be registered and are therefore illegal. 
My fieldwork  and  interaction with my  undergraduate  students 
during teaching and learning fiqh, does not reveal much change among 
Muslims in relation to adherence to the classical fiqh. Most Muslims tend 
to obey what is stated in the classical fiqh as if  they live in the same place 
and time with its writers and tend to disobey and even undermine some 
of  the Marriage Law articles. Most of  my research participants from a 
religious education background and my students at UIN (Universitas 
Islam Negeri,  Bandung)  adhere  strongly  to  classical  fiqh  in  dealing 
14 Azyumardi Azra, “The Indonesian Marriage Law of  1974: An 
Institutionalization of  the Shari’a for Social Changes”, in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi 
Azra (eds), Shari‘a and Politics in Modern Indonesia. (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 76–95.
15 June S. Katz and Ronald S. Katz, “Legislating Social Change in a Developing 
Country: The New Indonesian Marriage Law Revisited”, The American Journal of  
Comparative Law, vol. 26, no. 2 (1978), pp. 309–20.
16 Azra, “The Indonesian Marriage Law of  1974: An Institutionalization of  the 
Shari’a for Social Changes”, pp. 88–9
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with issues of  marriage, divorce and polygamy. For them, this classical 
Islamic jurisprudence applies to all Muslims, anytime anywhere and is 
therefore not subject to change. Since fiqh does not require registration 
for a marriage to be valid and does not require court permission before 
obtaining divorce and practicing polygamy, many Indonesian Muslims 
disobey these provisions of  the Marriage Law. The state is viewed as 
only having authority over administrative matters, which did not include 
marriage, divorce and polygamy.
My fieldwork  revealed most  polygamous marriages  among my 
research participants were unregistered. Only a few applications for 
permission of  polygamous marriage were received: Bandung Religious 
Court receiving only 13 applications in 2013 and six applications per 
year in 2011 and 2012. However, unhealthy polygamous marriages were 
a common ground for divorce. For example, Bandung Religious Court 
did not receive any applications for polygamy in 2003, but unhealthy 
polygamy was listed as a cause in 47 cases of  divorce that year of  the 
32 cases of  polygamous marriage among my research participants: 18 
polygamous marriages were unregistered; eight cases had marriage 
certificates without following court procedures, such as by claiming that 
the husband was single; two marriages were first unregistered and then 
followed court procedures after their polygamous marriages; only four 
cases legally followed court procedures but of  these four cases, only 
one truly followed court requirements without any manipulation. This 
manipulation and disobedience to the law can be construed as Muslim 
resistance to the secular Law. 
When I asked one of  my research participants, Atikah, why there 
was manipulation involved, Atikah17 told me: 
“In order for the application for permission to be granted, we needed just 
to follow what the court staff  told us. For example, my husband’s income 
was only Rp400.000 per month, which was not even enough to support 
one household. The court staff  told us that if  we stated my husband’s 
true income, the court would not give my husband permission to take 
another wife, so my husband changed his income to Rp5.000.000”.
A Bandung municipal court staff  member confirmed this, when 
I asked whether they helped or suggested the applicants to manipulate 
17 Interview with Atikah, 23 Feb 2004.
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data in the application for polygamy. The staff  member said that:18 
“Basically, those person who come here want their application for 
polygamy to be granted by the court, so we tell them administratively 
what to do in order for the application to be granted, even though it 
will be the judge who decides whether the application can be granted or 
not. We know that the judge will usually grant permission when all the 
required documents are available and reasonable.”
This paper will summarize three cases of  polygamous marriages: 
one case of  legal polygamy (Atikah-Ikin-Nuni) and two cases of  illegal 
polygamy: Hanny-Asep-Nuning and Dahlia-Dadi-Titin-Nita. Other cases 
will only mentioned when relevant to the discussion of  income and 
property distribution among wives in polygamous marriages.
D. Case Studies on Polygamy
1. Case 1: Legal Polygamy, the Marriage of  Atikah-Ikin-Nuni19
Atikah (37)20 and Ikin (39) had no religious education background. 
Both graduated from the same Arts Institution, Atikah with a Diploma 
in Dance and Ikin, her classmate, after completing his undergraduate 
studies, continued his study to a master’s level. Atikah and Ikin founded 
and managed an art gallery. In addition, Atikah founded and ran a 
kindergarten in her mother’s town, Karawang (about three hours drive 
from Bandung), while Ikin taught part-time in one of  the private higher 
education institutions. Atikah had been married to Ikin for 12 years with 
three children, aged 11, 7 and 1 when Ikin asked her permission to take 
another wife in 2002. 
Atikah told me that she was reluctant to give her husband 
permission to take Nuni, one of  his students, as his second wife. However, 
Atikah eventually relented only to avoid the accusation that she was 
“allowing” her husband to continue his illicit relationship with Nuni. 
Therefore, she finally granted permission, on condition that Ikin must 
18 Interview with Bandung Municipal Religious Court staff  member on 7 Feb 
2004.
19 Interview with Atikah, 23 Feb 2004.
20 The number in the bracket indicates the participant’s age at the time of  
interview. All participant names are pseudonyms.
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choose to divorce either Nuni or Atikah should his second marriage 
negatively affect the first. 
Before going to court to apply for permission to take a second 
wife, Ikin introduced Nuni to Atikah in their art gallery, not in their 
house. Neither Ikin nor Atikah wanted other members of  their family to 
know about this second marriage because it was shameful. Attempting 
to prevent Nuni from marrying Ikin, Atikah reminded Nuni that Ikin 
was already married with three children, and that his income was very 
low. Nuni did not object to Ikin’s marital and economic status. Failing 
to prevent her from marrying Ikin, Atikah requested that Nuni let her 
arrange everything for the second marriage, such as that Ikin was only 
allowed to visit Nuni one day a week, namely Tuesday. Nuni agreed to 
obey Ikin and Atikah. This shows Atikah’s agency in accommodating 
her husband’s willingness to practise polygamy and negotiating the best 
possible arrangement in the situation of  polygamous marriage.
Atikah told me that during the court hearing, the judges seemed 
surprised at her consent to her husband’s intention to take another wife, 
which was a rare and difficult requirement for a husband to achieve: 
“The judges seemed to be surprised that I could give permission to my 
husband to marry another woman. Because I have given my approval 
to my husband and all administrative requirements look OK, then the 
judges approved the application”.
Atikah did not only involve herself  in the arrangements of  her 
husband’s second marriage, but she also successfully ended this marriage 
four months later. Atikah had decided to ask her husband to divorce 
Nuni due to their family’s economic deterioration. After his second 
marriage,  Ikin  had  less  time  to work  and had difficulties  supporting 
two households from his small income, which was not even enough 
to support one household. As a result, Ikin had accumulated a large 
amount of  debt and her children’s tuition was unpaid. In addition, Nuni 
had become increasingly more demanding. Nuni often called Ikin and 
asked him to accompany her shopping when Ikin was with Atikah. She 
also demanded an extra day’s visit, from one to two then three days a 
week. She also wanted Ikin to give her Rp300.000 per month (in 2002), 
but Atikah told Nuni that Atikah only received Rp20.000 per day to 
support herself, three children and one domestic servant. Initially, Ikin 
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rejected the idea of  divorcing Nuni because, according to Atikah, he 
seemed to be seduced by her. Nuni also did not want to be divorced. 
However, Atikah insisted that Ikin keep his promise. Finally, Ikin made 
the decision to divorce Nuni.
When the divorce took place, it was Atikah who took care of  
the divorce papers and paid all the administrative expenses, including 
the divorce settlement demanded by Nuni. Nuni had demanded a 
Rp15.000.000 divorce settlement, but Ikin only agreed to pay Rp2.000.000. 
Initially, the court agreed to the divorce settlement amount Nuni had 
proposed because the judges assumed that Ikin had treated Nuni unfairly 
by only marrying her for four months. However, Atikah explained to them 
that Nuni’s marriage to Ikin had negatively affected her own marriage and 
in fact Atikah had financially supported Nuni’s household due to Ikin’s 
very low income. Understanding Atikah’s suffering, the judges decided 
that Ikin should pay Nuni Rp5.000.000 for the divorce settlement. Atikah 
initially objected to such a large amount of  money, but then she agreed 
because she wanted to the case settled. Her husband’s polygamous 
marriage had cost her a lot of  money and left her family with a large 
debt. She showed me the proof  of  bank transfer she had made to Nuni 
for the divorce settlement and at the time of  interview she said that she 
still needed to repay Rp7.000.000 of  the remaining debt her husband 
had incurred during his polygamous marriage.
The 1974 Marriage Law was drafted on the assumption that all 
men are capable of  being the head of  the family, providing the economic 
support of  the family (Articles 31 and 34). The Law was also drafted 
based on the patriarchal assumption that men are by nature polygamous 
(Articles 3-5). The case of  Atikah-Ikin-Nuni, however, shows that not 
all men are capable of  providing sufficient economic support for the 
family. In fact, it was Atikah, the first wife who was the main economic 
support of  the family. It is possible that Ikin felt inferior to Atikah due 
to his inability to provide sufficient economic support for the family and 
wanted to show his “superiority” as a male by doing something “legal and 
acceptable” which could not be done by Atikah as a woman, namely to 
practice polygamy. As a consequence, Atikah had to work more to increase 
her income to meet her expenditure, not only to support her family but 
also to support the economic needs of  her husband’s second wife.
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Atikah told me that she and her husband had founded and run an 
art gallery but when they were about to enjoy the results of  their hard 
work, Nuni entered their married life. Therefore, it was for this economic 
reason, and because she loved her husband and her children, that Atikah 
was determined to save her marriage. Atikah’s willingness to save her 
household  from economic deterioration fits  very well with Brenner’s 
assumption that women’s real concern with their spouses’ extramarital 
affairs is the “draining of  family resources” to support the affairs.21  
2. Case 2: Illegal Polygamy, the Marriage of  Dahlia-Dadi-Titin-Nita22
This case shows the agency of  Titin and Nita, Dadi’s second and 
third wives, in taking economic advantage from their illegal marriage and 
the passivity of  Dahlia, Dadi’s legal first wife, who never demanded fair 
maintenance and equal time with her husband even though she felt that 
she had been treated unfairly. 
Dahlia (52) claimed to have an unhappy marriage. She told me 
that her husband, Dadi (55), an Islamic law professor in one of  the 
Islamic higher educational institutions, was often involved in affairs with 
other women. In 2001, after they had been married for about 23 years 
and had four children, Dadi secretly took Titin as a second wife. Dahlia 
was shocked to discover this when she was phoned by an anonymous 
person who told her that Dadi had taken another wife. After checking 
the validity of  the news, Dahlia was hospitalized with emotional distress 
for three days.
Because her husband never mentioned his other wife, Dahlia 
could not be involved in “managing” Dadi’s arrangement of  income and 
time spent with Titin. However, Dahlia easily observed the changes in 
Dadi’s economic management. Before taking an extra wife, Dadi usually 
gave Dahlia all his income, of  at least Rp10.000.000 per month for her 
to manage. This economic management, in Pahl’s term,23 is called a 
whole wage system. After the second marriage, however, Dadi gradually 
reduced  the  income he gave  to Dahlia  until  she finally  received only 
21 Suzanne April Brenner, The Domestication of  Desire Women, Wealth, and Modernity 
in Java (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 151.
22 Based on interviews with Dahlia, 27 Feb 2004; 20 Jul 2012; 3 Jan 2004.
23 Jan Pahl, “Patterns of  Money Management within Marriage”, Journal of  Social 
Policy, vol. 9, no. 3 (1980), pp. 313–35.
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Rp1.500.000  to Rp2.000.000 per month, which was far from enough to 
cover her household expenses. In Pahl’s term, Dadi changed his economic 
management, from a whole wage system to an allowance system.24
To cover the income gap, Dahlia, who worked as a part time lecturer 
at one of  the private Islamic higher institutions, used her personal savings, 
which soon ran out. Because Dadi no longer gave Dahlia all his income, 
Dahlia let Dadi pay all the bills and all their children’s educational tuition 
fees. She was very sad at this change of  economic arrangements, which 
impacted negatively on the economic wellbeing of  herself  and especially 
her children. She could usually meet their children’s demands for money 
immediately when they needed it, but after Dadi’s polygamous marriage, 
Dahlia had to tell her children to ask themselves for money from Dadi. 
As her husband was rarely at home, it was difficult for her children to 
obtain the money they needed. Even when they could meet their father, 
sometimes Dadi was angry with his children when they asked for money 
to pay their tuition fees, saying: “If  you need such a large amount of  
money, you need to tell me earlier so I can have the money ready”. Dahlia 
was very sad at this situation because she knew it was not easy for her 
children to even meet Dadi.
In 2006, Dadi married his third wife, Nita, illegally. Nita, former 
Dadi’s master’s student, became the most dominant wife, demanding Dadi 
spend most his time with her. Titin, who had one son with Dadi, also 
demanded Dadi deal with marriage registration so her son could obtain 
his birth certificate. However, Dadi ignored Titin’s demands for marriage 
registration and asked Titin to deal with it herself. Dadi told me that he did 
not want to obey the Marriage Law because it was enforced on Indonesian 
Muslims as a way of  secularization. This shows Dadi’s awareness of  
the history prior to the enactment of  the Marriage Law, where many 
Muslims suspected the government of  attempts at secularization and 
Christianisation through the enactment of  the Marriage Law.
Titin was a village woman who saw the economic and social 
benefits  of  marrying Dadi  because Dadi  is  a  respected  “religious” 
professor, even though she knew that he was married. However, after 
24 Allowance system is when a husband only gives certain amount of  his income 
to his wife, which is different from the whole wage system in which the husband give 
all his wages to his wife to manage; bid. 
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Dadi’s third marriage, Titin apparently did not to see any future in her 
marriage and seemed to suffer from Dadi’s economic and emotional 
neglect. Therefore, in 2008, Titin asked for divorce and surrendered 
the custody of  her son to Dadi, needing to earn a living. She decided 
to work in Saudi Arabia. This shows Titin’s agency in deciding what is 
best for her future: to be out of  an illegal polygamous marriage which 
no longer provided her with the economic and social benefits that she 
had expected. She thought that after the marriage, Dadi would provide 
her with a marriage certificate that would secure her rights to marital 
joint property, maintenance and inheritance. However, unexpectedly, 
Dadi took another wife and neglected Titin, just as he had done earlier 
to Dahlia after his secret marriage with Titin.
Nita was then also in the same position that Titin had occupied, 
merely Dadi’s illegal otherwife. Being aware of  her disadvantageous 
position, she seemed to strategize the situation by demanding Dadi spend 
most of  his time with her and income on her. Knowing Nita’s agency 
in securing her access to Dadi’s income to accumulate property under 
her name on the one hand and Dahlia’s “acceptance” of  her husband’s 
illegal polygamous marriage, it might be easy to conclude that Dahlia is 
a passive victim of  polygamy, especially as she did not dare to ask for 
maintenance from Dadi. However, Dahlia can also be seen as an active 
agent by maintaining her status as Dadi’s legal wife. Dahlia told me that 
she was aware of  her rights for joint marital property if  she asked for 
divorce but she had not asked for divorce even though she felt that she 
had been treated unjustly because this would only make Nita happy and 
facilitate her becoming the sole, legal wife of  Dadi, “If  I ask for divorce, 
it is easier for Nita to be the only wife of  Bapak [Dadi] and this would 
make her happier”.
3. Case 3: Illegal Polygamy, the Marriage of  Sumi-Asep-Nuning25
This case shows the agency of  Sumi, who planned and prepared her 
divorce for about fifteen years by preparing herself  to be economically 
independent while waiting for her children to grow up. Sumi (42) had 
married Asep (46) in 1980, when Sumi was in the final year of  secondary 
school, at the age of  19, and Asep was a student at the state Islamic 
25 Interview with Sumi,  23 Dec 2003.
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university, at the age of  23. Asep was a good-looking man with a great 
talent of  preaching Islam. When she married him, Sumi did not know 
that Asep was already married with two children. Sumi was shocked and 
disappointed when she discovered this fact during her visit to Asep’s 
parents, in her seventh year of  marriage, when she was in her third 
pregnancy. Since that time, although Asep finally divorced his first wife, 
Sumi claimed to have an unhappy marriage and felt that her marriage 
would end with divorce. In addition, she had also discovered that her 
husband had had an affair with his student, Yani, since the first year of  
her marriage to Asep.
Sumi wanted to divorce her husband but she had three small 
children. She did not want to neglect or hurt her children by leaving her 
marriage. Therefore, she decided to stay in her unhappy marriage whilst 
she prepared herself  to be economically independent after the divorce. 
She participated in a special education program to obtain her senior high 
school certificate. After that, she asked for her husband’s permission to 
take a bridal make-up and stylist course because she wanted to make a 
living as a bridal stylist. However, her husband objected and suggested 
instead that she study in the Islamic institution, where he works as a 
lecturer. Sumi told me that Asep was afraid she would be involved in an 
extramarital affair if  she worked as a bridal stylist. In 1988, Sumi enrolled 
herself  in the Islamic institution to obtain a bachelor degree in teaching 
English. She also saved the money she received from her husband, who 
was a famous religious preacher and received high fees from his preaching. 
From these savings, she bought some land in her mother’s village and had 
someone run her clothing business. In addition, she renovated her house, 
which was built on her mother’s land, into a big luxurious house. In 2003, 
when she discovered that her husband had secretly married Nuning (46), 
she asked her son to ask his father to divorce her. At that time, all her 
children had grown up (23, 21, 16 and 13). Even though her children were 
sad at her decision to seek a divorce, her children understood there was 
another woman in their parents’ marriage. In October 2003, even though 
he was ashamed of  divorcing his wife, Asep accepted his son’s request 
to divorce Sumi. At that time, Asep assumed that Sumi could not live 
without him and his economic support, so he predicted that Sumi would 
soon regret her decision and return to him. Based on this assumption, 
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he just left the house after the divorce without disputing or dividing their 
joint marital property. He did not know that Sumi had prepared for this 
divorce for about fifteen years and did not want to remarry him, even 
though Asep still wanted to remarry her. Sumi explained the economic 
arrangement during her marriage. In the first four years of  her marriage, 
Sumi received financial support from her mother, in addition to receiving 
Asep’s entire salary, which was very low, and his additional fees from 
preaching and attending meetings. In 1984, she noticed that Asep had 
reduced the money he usually gave her from his additional income. Sumi 
assumed that someone had reminded Asep to give some of  his income 
to support his first wife and two children. She knew that her husband 
did not give her all the fees from his preaching because she noted her 
husband’s fees, usually given directly to her when she accompanied him, 
ranged from Rp1.000.000 to Rp2.500.000 while her husband only gave 
her about Rp300.000 when she did not accompany him preaching. From 
this, she could calculate how much money her husband gave his other 
wife and two children.
Sumi also just realized that Asep no longer gave her the whole of  
his salary in the last stage of  their marriage in 2003. She accidentally saw 
the receipt of  his monthly salary of  Rp4.500.000 but Asep only gave her 
Rp3.300.000. She was quiet about this and did not dare to ask for more 
money because once she had asked for more money and was answered 
rudely by Asep: 
“I have given you all the money, what extra money should I give you?” 
Sumi was quiet, even though she knew that her husband had changed his 
financial arrangements. She used to receive all his income to manage to 
cover all daily expenses and pay for the children’s school fees, but once he 
married another woman, Asep reduced the money he usually gave to Sumi.
E. Women’s Agency in Accessing Income and Property in Legal 
and Illegal Polygamous Marriages
The case studies described in this chapter show that the husband’s 
practice of  polygamy has a negative effect on the first wife’s access to 
income, causing a drain on the family resources to support the husband’s 
additional wife/ves as noted by Brenner.26 This support, in the case of  
26 Brenner, The Domestication of  Desire Women.
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Ikin and Nuni, was provided by Atikah, the first wife, due to Ikin’s low 
income, which made him unable even to support one household. This 
case also challenges the patriarchal belief  that men are by nature leaders 
of  the family who can economically support the family, like what is done 
by Pemberdayaan Perempuan Kepala Keluarga/Pekka [Women Headed 
Household Empowerment ].27
None of  the existing wives, in legal or illegal polygamous marriages, 
could accept their husband’s polygamous marriage/s but legal polygamy 
provided better conditions for all the parties in this type of  situation. For 
example, Atikah could control and intervene in her husband’s relationship 
with his second wife, Nuni, by limiting his visit to her to 1-2 days a 
week and limiting the amount of  maintenance her husband provided 
her. However, unknown to Atikah, Ikin apparently increased Nuni’s 
maintenance in response to Nuni’s increasing demands, by borrowing 
money from other sources, which finally had to be repaid by Atikah.
Atikah’s case is different from Dahlia, whose husband secretly and 
illegally took another wife. This left Dahlia with little ability to “control” 
her husband’s visits and maintenance to his other wife. Unlike Atikah, 
who exercised her agency to restore the economic welfare of  her family, 
by asking her husband to divorce his other wife, Dahlia did not seem to 
seek reasonable maintenance and time with her husband, even though she 
felt that she was unfairly treated. Dahlia understood her rights to half  of  
the joint marital property should she decide to ask for divorce, stating: “If  
I ask for divorce, I will get half  of  our joint marital property, but I love 
Bapak [Dadi] and I want to stay in my marriage”. She seemed to find it 
difficult to leave her “comfort zone” of  being “Mrs Dadi,” despite her 
economic and emotional suffering. Dahlia’s determination to stay in her 
unhappy marriage, however, can also be interpreted as her excercising 
agency to preserve her right and access to joint marital property and 
block any opportunity for Nita to be Dadi’s sole legal wife.
27 The name of  Pekka itself  has shown its challenge to patriarchal belief  that only 
men can be family leader and breadwinner. See “Nani Zulminarni: Dare to be a woman”, 
Pekka.or.id (16 Sep 2010), http://www.pekka.or.id/index.php/id/laporan/118-news/
pekka-in-the-news/168-nani-zulminarni-dare-to-be-a-woman.html , accessed 2 Mar 
2016. Also See “Nani Zulminarni: Dare to be a woman”, The Jakarta Post (13 Sep 
2010), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/09/13/nani-zulminarni-dare-be-
a-woman.html, accessed 2 Mar 2016.
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The practice of  polygamy indeed tends to diminish the economic 
wellbeing of  the existing wife by depriving her of  access to the full 
income of  her husband. In the case of  Atikah, the husband’s polygamous 
marriage increased her economic burden by requiring her to support her 
husband’s other wife.
Unlike Atikah who successfully made her husband divorce his 
other wife, Sumi could no  longer endure her husband’s  infidelity and 
determined to end her marriage. Being aware of  the threat of  economic 
insecurity living without financial support, she prepared herself  over a 
long period of  time to be economically independent after her divorce. 
Although Asep assumed that she would soon return to him because he 
believed that she could not live without him, in fact Sumi felt relieved 
after the divorce. Asep’s assumption led him to leave the house after the 
divorce without disputing their marital joint property, such as land and 
house, some of  which were under Sumi’s name, which was all to Sumi’s 
economic advantage post-divorce.
The above three case studies have shown that in the legal 
polygamous marriages, time spent with husband and income distribution 
was decided before the polygamous marriage took place, yet after marriage, 
Nuni demanded a greater share than what had been agreed upon. This 
shows that justice cannot easily be achieved even in legal polygamy. In 
illegal polygamy, Dadi, who seemed to command the authority in the 
marriage, decided his own roster and income distribution as he wished. 
He visited his wives  as  he wished  and  gave  an  indefinite  amount of  
money to Dahlia, his first wife. Dadi changed his income management, 
from a whole wage system when he was monogamous where he gave all 
his income to Dahlia, to an allowance system when he was polygamous 
where he only gave Dahlia a small amount of  money, which was far 
from enough to cover her family expenses.28 Similar to Dadi, Asep also 
changed his economic management, from a whole wage system to an 
allowance system after he took another wife. However, compared to Dadi, 
Asep still tended to give more money to Sumi, who had given him four 
children, even though their marriage finally ended in divorce. This shows 
that the whole wage system, which provided more opportunity for the 
wife Sumi to manoeuver from her unhappy marriage, was only suitable 
28 Pahl, “Patterns of  Money”.
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for monogamous marriage. Therefore, polygamous husbands tend to 
change their economic management from the whole wage system to an 
allowance system to enable them to more easily distribute their income 
to more than one wife. This system, however, as the above case studies 
have shown, negatively affected the economic wellbeing of  the existing 
wife and children. All of  these findings negate the idealised polygamous 
marriage promoted by Puspo Wardoyo in 2003.29
F. Concluding Remaks
Prior to the 1974 Marriage Law, Indonesian women had no legal 
protection for their rights within marriage. There were frequent cases 
of  forced marriage, child marriage, easy and unilateral divorce as well as 
arbitrary polygamy. After the enactment of  the Marriage Law in 1974, 
after a five decade campaign, polygamy is still permitted but permission 
from  the  Religious  Court’ must  first  be  sought  before  entering  a 
polygamous marriage. However, many members of  “religious” groups 
tend to ignore this provision because they view it as conflicting with fiqh. 
Consequently, there are many cases of  unregistered marriage, divorce 
and polygamy, in which the persons involved have no legal protection, 
so that the children born of  such marriages lack the birth certificate they 
need to attend school and their mothers cannot claim their rightful joint 
marital property and inheritance. 
The economic welfare of  women and their children tends to be 
negatively impacted by polygamy. In a monogamous marriage where all 
the man’s whole wage is largely devoted to supporting the household, 
when a man has several households his economic support shifts to an 
allowance system so that support for the household of  the first wife is 
much reduced. This can be clearly seen in the above three case studies, 
although the fallacy of  assuming the male is always the key income earner 
has also been highlighted in the case of  Atikah and Ikin. It is clear that 
from this case and that of  Sumi and Asep that women can display agency 
in dealing with their husband’s polygamous marriages in order to preserve 
their rights and access to marital property.
The economic motives of  becoming an additional wife are evident 
29 Eko Suryono, Kiat Sukses Beristri Banyak: Pengalaman Puspo Wardoyo Bersama 4 
Istri (Solo: Bumi Wacana, 2003).
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in the case of  Titin and Nita. Titin asked for divorce when she no longer 
received economic benefits from her marriage whereas Nita, who actively 
dominated Dadi’s time and income at the expense of  the first wife, Dahlia, 
perhaps because she realised as an illegal wife, she could not access joint 
marital property should Dadi divorce her or obtain an inheritance should 
he pass away. Further research would be valuable on the economic motives 
of  such additional wives and the disadvantages of  being in a secret/
unregistered marriage because many polygamous marriages involve young 
women marrying much older and well-to-do men.
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